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Of Solemn Oaths and Obligations: The
Environmental Impact of the ICJ's Decision
in the Case Concerning the Gab Cikovo-N agymaros
Project

Stephen Stec and Gabriel E. Eckstein
The law of treaties often conjures up images of states as rotund gentlemen
with whiskers, vests, and watch-chains proclaiming solemn and chivalric
oaths upon their honour. Treaties are sacred in the same way that a man's
word is his bond. This type of relationship among states is largely unquestioned since much of the way we live in the world depends upon the assumption of the inviolability of sovereign states and their treaties. Any challenge to
these assumptions would surely evoke horror at the unmentionable void that
would result-except in lawyers who make their livings shaving nuances.
However, in the context of the environment, the analogy between states and
barons begins to break down. Environmental impacts flow unimpeded across
the boundaries of sovereign states, without respect for body or boundary.
People form alliances across borders in order to pursue broader, more global
issues. Support for adding the environment to the list of concerns that may
justify interference in the affairs of neighbouring states is increasing.
Environmental concerns when they relate to the actions and responsibilities
of states, moreover, are increasingly expressed in the language of sustainable
development and the precautionary principle.
This is perhaps why expectations were so high when the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) tackled the Case Concerning the GabNkovo-Nagymaros
Project (hereinafter GabCikovo-Nagymaros case)1 and the opportunity was
presented to strike a new balance between international environmental law
and the law of treaties. This was the first case in which the ICJ considered the
concept of sustainable development. What better scenario to give credence
to the notion of sustainable development than a case concerning a "gigomaniacal"2 scheme with its roots in the archaic, discredited, and inherently
1 Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), (Judgment of 25
September 1997), 371.L.M. 162 (1998).
2 In the words of Vacia v Havel. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, February 18, 1991. Part 2,
Eastern Europe; A. International Affairs; 2 USSR-Eastern European Relations; EEI0999/A21l
Headline: Czechoslovak President on Security Co-operation and Nagymaros Barrage.
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unsustainable form of development known as scientific socialism. The complex set offacts that were presented provided sufficient room for the Court to
give guidance on the extent to which environmental protection concerns, in
the context of shifting developmental paradigms, could justify the substantial
reformation or termination of a treaty. The Court had the opportunity to balance two interests-each of which involved an intrusion upon sovereigntyfirst, the interest in enforceable rules of conduct guiding relations among
nations and, second, the interest in protecting the common heritage of
mankind against ill-conceived development. In addition, the IC] had the
chance to elaborate on the development of international law concerning
shared natural resources as well as to provide an impetus for the recently
adopted UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of
International Watercourses (Watercourses Convention).3 Most importantly,
perhaps, the Court had the opportunity to apply an emerging principle of
international environmental law-the precautionary principle-in order to
make proponents oflarge-scale investments responsible for the ecological justification of such projects.
Another case of this nature may not come along for quite a while. Thus,
when the decision of the Court was finally issued in September 1997, it was disappointing for many. However, the conservative approach taken by the Court,
which was composed of members from all over the world, was not unexpected.
The Court scrutinized Hungary's reluctance to continue building the
Nagymaros Dam and to negotiate more strictly than it treated
Czechoslovakia's ongoing construction and ultimately illegal implementation
of Variant C. Nevertheless, the judgment did open the door to an interpretation of treaty implementation that could radically alter the original scheme.
Moreover, the decision contains several findings and statements of potential
significance to future cases. These findings and statements touch upon several
issues, including the nature of joint projects, the status and importance of environmental values, and the meaning of sustainable development. Some of the
implications bode well for the protection of the environment and others do not.
The judgment, however, is likely more significant for the questions that it
failed to answer and for the opportunities that it missed in advancing international environmental law. While, on the one hand, it confirmed the substantive nature of environmental protection as a core value implicit in
sustainable development; on the other hand, it failed to take adequate
account of the fundamental failure of technical solutions to protect the environment with respect to immense and inflexible public works projects, such as
the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros project. In order to arrive at a decision that relied
upon the provisions of the 1977 Treaty, the Court had to acrobatically avoid
many of the opportunities that were presented to it, and, in so doing, sent a
3

(1997), 36 I.L.M. 700.
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clear message of its conservatism. Finally, the decision may be remembered
for the concepts that were introduced in its concurring opinions long after the
judgment itself is forgotten.
Of all the issues before the Court, the handling of the question of
Hungary's notification of termination attracted perhaps the greatest interest.
Indeed, it was this issue that generated most discussion in chambers since it
ultimately provoked the biggest split on the bench. Among the various arguments put forward by Hungary in this regard, the most significant ones
related to environmental protection, including necessity and changed circumstances. In regard to changed circumstances, the IC] showed little sympathy,
avoiding an indepth discussion of the issue. Even though the project arose
largely out of Cold War interests and the assumptions behind it were
profoundly affected by the loss of Soviet patronage, the shift to a market
economy, democratization, geopolitical developments, and improved environmental awareness, the Court made every effort to resolve the dispute
within the confines of the 1977 Treaty between Hungary and Czechoslovakia
and related documents.
With respect to the argument of necessity, the Court concluded that the
threats to ecology had not been sufficiently established and were merely perceived perils as opposed to actual and imminent threats. Surprisingly, the
Court determined this conclusion notwithstanding its unwillingness to evaluate the merits of the scientific data presented. The IC] expressly declined to
consider the value or the validity of the information presented to it by both
sides and asserted that "it is not necessary ... for [the Court] to determine
which of those points of view is scientifically better founded" (para. 54).
Although such information is possibly beyond the purview of the judges, the
Court's decision to ignore it raises a troubling question: how can a court
determine the degree or immediacy of a particular environmental threat without evaluating the very data describing the peril? Nevertheless, while not sustaining the argument in this case, the Court left the door open to the
possibility that even a legal pillar, such as pacta sunt servanda, might, in some
circumstances, have to yield to environmental concerns. In particular, the IC]
asserted that the threat of imminent harm could give rise to a state of necessity. As the precautionary principle develops, its impact on the meaning of
imminent harm might well create pressures on existing, rigid treaties. The
solution, therefore, should involve an increased flexibility in treaties with
respect to environmental matters.
In rejecting Hungary's environmental arguments, the Court leaned heavily
on three specific provisions of the 1977 Treaty. In the Court's words, Articles
15, 19, and 20 of the treaty, which pertain to the protection of nature, fisheries, and the quality of the Danube, "actually made available to the parties
the necessary means to proceed at any time, by negotiation, to the required
readjustments between economic imperatives and ecological imperatives,"
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through reference to the joint contractual plan according to which all
measures for implementation of the treaty would be carried out (para. 103).
These articles, in the Court's view, were designed to accommodate change
and reflected the understanding in 1977 that the implementation of the treaty
might need to take into account new developments in the state of environmental knowledge. In regard to Hungary's argument that these very provisions had been violated by Czechoslovakia in so far as it had not negotiated
in good faith to adapt the joint contractual plan to new scientific and legal
developments, the Court found as a factual matter that there was insufficient
evidence to conclude that Czechoslovakia had consistently refused to negotiate on this account. On the contrary, the Court found that Hungary's refusal
to countenance further construction pending negotiations had contributed to
the failure of the negotiations. This conclusion could only have come about
as a consequence of the Court's remarkable finding that Czechoslovakia's
substantial progress in the construction of Variant C-a unilateral provisional solution that the Court found to be in violation of international lawhad not justified termination.
This element of the decision is the weakest link. In the largest expression of
disunity on the bench, six judges concluded that Czechoslovakia had no right
to proceed to the provisional solution. In particular, the dissenters felt unable
to distinguish between the substantial work that had been done to complete
Variant C and its being put into operation. Czechoslovakia's actions with
respect to Variant C had implicitly belied its good faith towards Hungary's
concerns and, in the opinion of four of the dissenters, had justifiably
prompted Hungary's termination of the treaty. The logic of the dissenters'
argument is compelling, especially as the majority placed great weight on the
fact that Czechoslovakia had gone to enormous expense to carry out its part
of the project. The majority, therefore, did not adequately distinguish between
the substantial completion of the works under the treaty as an equitable argument in favour of specific performance and the massive investment in a white
elephant of a provisional solution, whose ultimate implementation the Court
later determined to be an internationally wrongful act.
Ironically, the Court's reluctance to condemn "preparatory acts," no matter how disingenuous, required it to look beyond the four corners of the treaty
to international legal principles concerning shared natural resources in order
to find that the implementation of Variant C had been illegal. The holding
that approximate application, even where one party claims to have taken into
account the interests of the other, cannot be used to extract benefits from a
failed joint project involving shared natural resources appears to provide a
means for one party to kill treaty regimes relating to such joint projects.
Moreover, since the Court took special notice of Hungary's difficulty in coordinating its position in 1989 during a transitional political phase, a people's
right to an equitable and reasonable sharing of an international watercourse
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appears to be independent of the machinations of its government and, thus,
could be raised at any time.
This kind of veto power, however, cannot be exercised without substantial
risk of liability. The Court placed a nearly insurmountable burden on
Hungary to demonstrate that Czechoslovakia had refused to consult with it
concerning possible environmental protection measures, even though
Czechoslovakia had refused to stop work on an illegal solution. On the contrary, suspension of work in these circumstances was considered "not conducive to negotiations." In the Court's mind, therefore, the status quo had
been based on a legal regime-in this case, for the construction of the barrage
system-rather than on the pre-existing physical and environmental conditions. The finding that Hungary had contributed to the failure of negotiations
under Articles 15, 19, and 20 would therefore make it exceedingly difficult for
a state to legitimately abandon construction of any project, on any grounds,
no matter how clearly its environmental impacts outweighed other considerations and regardless of irreversible harm.
While the majority of the Court found no problems with Slovakia's construction of Variant C, it did find that implementation of that scheme constituted an internationally wrongful act. It reached this conclusion by giving
credence to the long-argued notion that all riparian states enjoy a "perfect
equality" in the use of the waters of shared rivers.4 This concept has found
modern expression as a right of states to an equitable and reasonable share of
a transboundary resource and was recently codified by the UN in the
Watercourses Convention. s The Court's recognition of this principle, however, was merely perfunctory-a stepping stone towards its conclusion that
Slovakia's diversion of the Danube violated international law. The Court
asserted that in depriving Hungary of its right to a fair share of the river,
Slovakia had violated the international law norms of approximate application (although the Court did not discuss whether such a rule actually exists in
international law), of proportionality in effecting a countermeasure, and of
lawful mitigatory measures. The Court, however, never considered the right
of states to an equitable and reasonable share of a transboundary resource as
creating a legal obligation, nor that the deprivation of this right constituted a
transgression of international law in and of itself. Indeed, purposefully denying a state a fair share of water, which the state has enjoyed and expects to
have at its disposal, constitutes an injury to sovereignty.
In addressing the question regarding the diversion of the Danube, the
Court also neglected to substantively consider the more tangible injuries
caused to Hungary and to its environment. Under international watercourse
law, a corollary and a more established principle than that of equitable and
4 Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Commission of the River Oder, 1929 P.C.I.1.
(ser. A) No. 23, at 27.
5 Supra note 3, Article 5.
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reasonable use is the obligation of states not to cause significant harm to
other states in their use of a transboundary watercourse. In its decision, the
Court acknowledged the diversion's serious impacts on Hungary's ecology
(paras. 85 and 140) and even framed part of its proportionality argument
around "the continuing effects of the diversion of these waters on the ecology
of the riparian area of S~igetk6z" (para. 85). However, the IC] never evaluated the extent of the impact and, thus, did not assess whether the consequences constituted violations of international law. Given the Court's
acceptance of a safe and balanced ecology as an "essential" state interest and
its acknowledgment of actual harm, the absence of a more extensive treatment is surprising. Such an analysis might have been useful not only for
addressing the issues of this case but also for providing much needed clarification of the relationship between the principles of equitable and reasonable
use and of no significant harm-a relationship that continues to be a source
of much debate.
It is noteworthy that in discussing Slovakia's actions, the Court again
seemed to dismiss the importance of scientific evidence in assessing the environmental consequences of the diversion. While the Court used the possibility
of environmental damage as a basis for some of its arguments, it appraised neither the quantitative nor the qualitative "effects" of the river diversion on the
region's ecology nor the data suggesting the amount and quality of water
required to maintain a balanced natural and human environment. This lack of
scientific consideration in the Court's decision is troubling particularly in two
respects. First, it suggests that the Court was uncomfortable with science and
scientific evidence. Although the scientific analysis and data might have been
considered to be beyond the scope of the Court's expertise, this information
was highly relevant and should not have been discounted. Doing so allowed the
Court to ignore evidence that was at the very heart of the case. How else could
the Court establish whether a particular threat was plausible, what the ecological and human consequences of the threat might have been, whether it was
imminent, and whether it was so significant as to warrant corrective action?
The absence of scientific consideration in the Court's decision further suggests that the Court did not regard environmental concerns as being sufficiently important to override or modify treaty obligations. As noted earlier,
although the judgment seems to allow for the possibility of an abrogation of
treaty obligations on the grounds of ecological threats, this appears to apply
only to very limited cases. Unfortunately, the formidable burden of showing
likelihood of harm, as delineated by the Court, ignores the seriousness of
actual and future damage to the environment--ecological damage typically
requires years or decades of remediation at huge costs and some damage is
completely irreversible.
Thus, while the Court laudably found it unquestionable that the protection
of the natural environment is an "essential interest" of a state, it was unable
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to strike a balance between this essential interest and an immense investment,
even though it was an investment that might result in a long-term and uncertain impact on the environment. The Court, in the face of development interests, therefore, failed to uphold the precautionary principle. In particular, it
failed to take into account the implications of present uncertainty for future
generations and allowed for the continuation of activities with potentially
devastating environmental effects. Nowhere in the Court's decision was a balance struck between the admittedly significant investment in the construction,
which the Court viewed sympathetically, and the potentially larger costs of
environmental protection and future corrective measures. The attitude of the
Court towards this complex problem can be summed up by its cavalier suggestion that application of an end-of-pipe solution-potentially costly water
purification techniques-might be appropriate to address environmental
problems anticipated to arise from operation of the works. Principles of prevention and precaution are lost.
What is perhaps more remarkable, however, is that the Court, despite its
endorsement of a treaty regime that smacked of un sustain ability, went on to
invoke sustainable development in order to miraculously salvage something
from a sinking ship. This effort began with the simple statement that "newly
developed norms of environmental law are relevant for the implementation of
the Treaty" (para. 112). Was the Court relying on the ubiquitous Articles 15,
19, and 20 of the 1977 Treaty for this statement or on an obligation of international environmental law of more general applicability? Later in the judgment, the Court stated more clearly its opinion that "new [environmental]
norms have to be taken into consideration, and ... new standards given
proper weight, not only when States contemplate new activities but also when
continuing with activities begun in the past" (para. 140). Although Articles
15, 19, and 20 were again referred to in this paragraph of the judgment, the
Court took pains to point to a different source for this rule-the concept of
sustainable development. Applying the concept to the case, the Court held
that the parties should "look afresh" at the environmental impacts of the
operation of the Gabcikovo power plant.
This particular part of the Court's judgment appears to rely heavily on the
separate opinion of Judge Weeramantry. Judge Weeramantry proposed two
international legal principles and a new approach to dispute resolution in furthering the "harmonization of human developmental work with respect for
the natural environment."6 The two principles are continuing environmental
impact assessment (EIA) and contemporaneity in the application of environmental norms. Weeramantry drew upon erga omnes analysis in the resolution
of traditionally inter partes disputes.

6

Supra note 1 at 212 (separate opinion of Judge Weeramantry).
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The principle of continuing EIA is derived from the duty to continuously
monitor the environmental impacts of development projects as facts and
knowledge progress. However, it goes further in requiring an exchange of
information so that continuing EIAs can be accomplished in a cooperative
way. More than a mere concept, it is a principle with normative value. In the
context of the judgment in the GabCikovo-Nagymaros case, this principle provides the basis for restructuring the original project in a manner that is quite
different from what was envisioned at the time of the signing of the 1977
Treaty. Judge Weeramantry noted that Slovakia had taken the view in its submission that sustainable development includes the principle that "developmental needs are to be taken into account in interpreting and applying
environmental obligations," thereby indicating Slovakia's acceptance of sustainable development as the principle that harmonizes two vital and developing areas of law. 7 To deny sustainable development, therefore, would be to
condone a state of "normative anarchy." To further support his view, Judge
Weeramantry found substantial evidence that Articles 15, 19, and 20 of the
1977 Treaty, which inserted in the treaty an element of dynamism in relation
to environmental considerations, arose out of an early notion of sustainable
development. 8
The principle of continuing EIA is supplemented by the principle of
contemporaneity in the application of environmental norms. Beginning with
the simple statement: "Environmental rights are human rights,"9 Judge
Weeramantry goes on to propose that as the understanding of these human
rights evolves, the evolving norms must be applied accordingly. Judge
Weeramantry sums up this natural rights-based principle with the statement:
"The ethical and human rights related aspects of environmental law bring it
within the category oflaw so essential to human welfare that we cannot apply
to today's problems in this field the standards of yesterday." 10 Finally, Judge
Weeramantry considers the question of whether, in environmental cases, inter
partes principles, such as estoppel, can be applied. He concludes that environmental issues generally have erga omnes quality. Thus, where such issues
are of sufficient importance, estoppel and other inter partes arguments should
not be applied:
Supra note 1 at 205.
Yet even Judge Weeramantry's enlightened opinion takes only the first steps towards a truly
integrated approach to environment and development. The principle of sustainable development, according to Judge Weeramantry, enables the Court to balance environmental considerations against developmental considerations. Unfamiliarity with the concept of integration
reached a peak in Judge Oda's dissent, in which the judge took the view that economic development and preservation of the environment are more or less contradictory. He contends that
"modern technology would, I am sure, be able to provide some acceptable ways of balancing the
two conflicting interests" (emphasis supplied), supra note I at 224, (dissenting opinion of Judge
Oda).
9 Supra note I at 215.
10 Id.
7

8
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We have entered an era of international law in which international law not only subserves the interests of individual states but also looks beyond them and their parochial
concerns to the greater interests of humanity and to planetary welfare. In addressing
such problems, which transcend the individual rights and obligations of the litigating
states, international law will need to look beyond procedural rules fashioned for
purely inter partes litigation. l l

Had this view been fully adopted by the Court, the Court may have taken the
position that the uncertain impacts of the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros project
and, in particular, of Variant C on an international watercourse and on an
area of particular environmental sensitivity and value, might have justified a
departure from the prescriptions of the treaty-based regime. After all, it is
possible that by applying both the principle of continuing EIA and the precautionary principle, one would be led to the conclusion that the optimal
implementation of the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros works would have been the
"no alternative" alternative. In addition, this point brings into question the
Court's failure to respect a status quo ante based upon existing physical and
ecological values. The Court might have carved out an area of law in which
the global interest in environmental protection would permit the fashioning
of a compensatory remedy in cases where legitimate environmental concerns
require one party to abandon ajoint project. Nevertheless, in terms of the law
of sustainable development, the Court's recognition that environmental risks
have to be assessed on a continuous basis, even for projects begun long ago,
is a major contribution.
The GabCikovo-Nagymaros case bears witness to the critical role that environmental and sustainable development issues play in the deep transformations occurring in Eastern Europe. Given the factors that are present in this
region, it is significant, though not surprising, that it is there that the first case
in which the ICJ had to grapple with the concept of sustainable development
arose. The judgment and Judge Weeramantry's remarkable opinion ought to
be viewed together-not only in terms of legal substance but also in terms of
the flexibility and sufficiency of international legal mechanisms to respond to
concrete challenges such as those posed by developments in Eastern Europe.
The results of this response are mixed.
The Court's treatment of environmental issues in the case was perfunctory
at best, leading one commentator to assert that "the Court's pronouncements
on the environment are necessarily more recommendatory than pre scriptive."12 The Court failed to uphold the precautionary principle when it
required Hungary to meet the nearly insurmountable burden of showing the
likelihood of significant harm. It also failed to give recognition to a particular set of changed circumstances that were highly relevant to the notion of
II

12

Id. at 216.
P.H.F. Bekker, GabCikovo-Nagymaros Project, 92 AM. J.

INT'L

L. 273, 278 (1998).
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sustainable development-that is, to the revolutions of 1989 that purged a
fundamentally unsustainable set of economic and ecological values.
Furthermore, it neglected many substantive considerations and the application of the international law on the use and management of shared watercourses. Finally, it avoided any evaluation of the scientific data that might
have offered some justification for many of its conclusions.
The Court, however, did succeed in establishing a mechanism for taking
into account the progressive development of environmental law in order to
modify a treaty-based regime that does not depend on specific provisions of
the treaty itself. But the value of this mechanism is questionable because of
the substantial burdens placed on any party seeking to use it. The Court did
call for the application of the concept of sustainable development through the
constant reconsideration of the environmental consequences of a project.
Yet, it tied the hands of parties that determine that the integration of environmental protection values into development decisionmaking might require
a "no alternative" alternative. In the final analysis, forces on both sides of the
Danube in favour of the old fashioned technocratic approach to nature were
able to regroup under the nose of a vague IC] decision. As a result, one of
Europe's most precious natural resources may be one step further away from
sustainability.
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